February 2026 Student visa grant rates
The February 2026 student visa data is out. The headline number — 67.6% offshore grant rate for the higher education sector — is the lowest figure recorded in eight years of monthly reporting. This is not a processing fluctuation. This is policy in motion, and its effects are distributed very unevenly across source countries.
Every month, the Department of Home Affairs publishes BP0015 grant rate data covering visa subclass 500 applications. February’s numbers arrived last week. Reading them alongside the January 8 PRISMS country assessment level changes, and the absence of any corresponding provider-level update in March, produces a picture that every CRICOS provider and MARA agent in the international education space needs to sit with.
The numbers, unfiltered
The table below shows February 2026 offshore grant rates for the major source nationalities applying to Australian higher education providers. The shifts are not marginal.
The Sri Lanka trajectory deserves its own paragraph. Twelve months ago it was sitting at 98% — among the most reliable grant rates in the offshore cohort. By December it had slipped to 91%. By January, 81%. February landed at 62%. That is not a gentle trend. That is a step-change in how applications from that market are being assessed, and it arrived with very little public explanation.
“A 36-point collapse in twelve months. From one of the most reliable grant rates in the region, to sitting alongside countries under sustained scrutiny. Sri Lanka’s February number demands explanation.”
| Jan | Feb | Mar | Apr | May | Jun | Jul | Aug | Sep | Oct | Nov | Dec | Avg | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2026 | 64% | 60% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 62% |
| 2025 | 88% | 86% | 76% | 72% | 84% | 95% | 93% | 78% | 75% | 57% | 65% | 70% | 78% |
| 2024 | 83% | 73% | 69% | 67% | 55% | 85% | 74% | 83% | 85% | 69% | 90% | 93% | 77% |
| 2023 | 81% | 74% | 71% | 62% | 70% | 74% | 72% | 52% | 43% | 48% | 60% | 74% | 65% |
| 2022 | 93% | 89% | 74% | 82% | 75% | 96% | 98% | 86% | 56% | 57% | 72% | 86% | 80% |
| 2021 | 87% | 79% | 58% | 57% | 61% | 77% | 81% | 87% | 88% | 89% | 86% | 92% | 78% |
| 2020 | 92% | 90% | 79% | — | 100% | 100% | 88% | 91% | 94% | 96% | 89% | 83% | 91% |
| 2019 | 88% | 89% | 77% | 71% | 73% | 83% | 75% | 56% | 78% | 82% | 82% | 98% | 79% |
| 2017 | 94% | 91% | 84% | 83% | 78% | 88% | 89% | 87% | 80% | 87% | 88% | 95% | 87% |
What the PRISMS picture adds
These grant rate movements don’t exist in isolation. On 8 January 2026, the Department of Home Affairs issued an out-of-cycle PRISMS notification moving Bangladesh and Nepal from Evidence Level 2 to Level 3 — the highest risk classification under the Simplified Student Visa Framework. India and Bhutan moved to Level 3 in the same update. Sri Lanka moved from Level 1 to Level 2.
Evidence Level 3 means tighter documentary requirements: detailed bank statements, source-of-funds evidence, authenticated academic transcripts, increased biometric cross-matching.
Both the applicant’s country of citizenship and their CRICOS education provider are assigned an Evidence Level (1, 2, or 3). The combination determines the documentary burden for any given student visa application. Level 3 is the strictest setting — historically reserved for markets with significant fraud or non-compliance history.
Evidence levels for individual providers are not publicly published by Home Affairs. Agents and providers can infer them through the document checklist tool.
The February grant rates are, in part, the downstream consequence of those January assessment level changes landing in the middle of an active application cycle. Applications lodged before January 8 were caught by the new processing environment mid-stream — but that doesn’t fully explain Nepal at 35% or Sri Lanka’s continued freefall.
The provider risk level gap
Here is the part that warrants close attention for CRICOS providers. The March PRISMS provider risk level update has produced no changes. Provider assessment levels — which sit alongside country evidence levels to determine each student’s documentary burden — remain as they were.
Many in the sector anticipated that the volume of refusals flowing from Bangladesh and Nepal applicants would translate into corresponding provider-level adjustments in March. That hasn’t happened yet. Providers enrolled in these markets should not interpret the absence of change as a clean bill of health. The data is still accumulating.
Provider evidence levels are partly calculated on the basis of visa outcomes — including the proportion of refusals linked to fraud. When refusal volumes spike for a nationality cohort, that signal flows through to provider-level assessments over time, not immediately. The lag is real. Providers may be operating at their current level now, but facing a revised assessment in the next update cycle — with pipeline decisions already locked in.
What this means for the sector
- 01Pipeline forecasting needs recalibration. Providers who built 2026 intake projections on 2025 grant rate assumptions from South Asian markets are looking at a materially different conversion environment.
- 02Sri Lanka requires specific attention. The speed of the shift — 98% to 62% in twelve months — is unlike anything seen in the eight-year data set for a market of that size.
- 03The Genuine Student framework is being applied, not just described. Providers whose pre-enrolment processes were designed for the GTE era need to stress-test them against what’s actually happening at the decision stage.
- 04Nepal’s exposure is structural, not marginal. Nepal is the third-largest source country. A 35% offshore grant rate is not a footnote — it is a pipeline event.
- 05MARA agents are the first line of anticipation. Grant rate data at this granularity is the clearest forward signal available. If your agent network isn’t reading this data before lodgement, the refusal rate will tell that story later.
- 06The provider risk level watch continues. Providers relying on a Level 1 or Level 2 classification to support conversion from high-scrutiny markets should be modelling what a level change would mean for their pipeline.
- 07The 485 fee doubling compounds the disincentive stack. From 1 March 2026, the Temporary Graduate visa fee doubled to $4,600. That stacks on top of a $2,000 student visa fee, a 35% grant rate for Nepal, and a 49% rate for Bangladesh. The post-study pathway is materially more expensive and less certain than the pitch many students responded to.
The broader context
In the year to December 2025, 846,321 international students studied in Australia — a 0.5% decline on 2024. Total enrolments fell 3% to 1,058,040. Commencements dropped 15% to 479,104. ELICOS tells the sharpest story: enrolments down 35%, with the bottom falling out of the Latin American market in particular.
Dr Abul Rizvi, former Deputy Secretary of the Department of Immigration: the government raised the 2026 planning level to 295,000 — 25,000 more than 2025 — encouraging providers to increase recruitment, then used offshore refusal rates to contain the net migration impact. Applications are up over 13,000 year-on-year to January; grants are down over 11,000. The sector was invited to recruit and is now absorbing the policy correction.
The economic consequence
International students are not a single economic category — they are three at once. Fee-paying students bringing offshore income into the country. Immediate consumers paying rent, filling shifts at cafés and aged care facilities, buying groceries. And a flexible workforce filling roles domestic labour supply has consistently undersupplied. The ABS values education exports at $55 billion for 2025 — that figure captures tuition revenue. It does not capture the café in Ultimo that relies on student foot traffic, or the hospitality roster that only works because someone studying nursing picks up weekend shifts.
International students have become the adjustment variable in a political argument primarily about net migration optics and housing pressure. The Coalition has called the sector a racket. The government raised the 2026 planning level with one hand and is using refusal rates to constrain actual arrivals with the other. Neither position engages seriously with what these students represent as an economic instrument.
When student numbers fall, the economic impact runs in two directions simultaneously. The first is direct: less offshore income enters the country. The second is indirect: the jobs supported by that spending — in retail, hospitality, property management, transport — contract alongside demand.
The combined signal reaching prospective students in South Asia, Latin America and South-East Asia is not “Australia is selective.” It is “Australia is expensive, uncertain and getting harder.” That distinction matters for what comes next in the pipeline.
The February grant rate data is the most granular visible signal in all of this. The commencements figures are the consequence already in motion. The 485 fee doubling is the latest policy input still working its way through the system. And the economic argument — offshore income, local consumption, employment — is the frame that explains why what looks like a compliance story is actually a macroeconomic one.
Educli
How the migration and international education system actually works — not the spin, the mechanics.
DATA SOURCES
DHA BP0015 — locked at 2026-02-28 (published 27 Mar 2026)
Dept of Education International Student Monthly Summary (Dec 2025)
ABS — Education Export Revenue 2025
PRISMS Country Assessment Level Notification (8 Jan 2026)
Independent Australia — Abul Rizvi (3 Mar 2026)
The Koala — Commencements Fall as Policy Pressure Bites (Mar 2026)
data.gov.au dataset: Student visa program (ID 324aa4f7)